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ARE YOU IN GOOD HANDS?:
IS THE USE OF IN-HOUSE COUNSEL RIGHT FOR SOUTH CAROLINA
INSURANCE DEFENSE?

1.

INTRODUCTION

There are few residents in South Carolina that do not fall into one of the
following categories: vehicle owners, homeowners, business operators, or members
of professional organizations. These groups have two characteristics in common:
an overwhelming need for liability insurance and a need for a requirement within
insurance policies that the insurer defend the insured against any liability claim
covered by the policy. It has been estimated that up to thirty-five percent of the total
amount paid out by liability insurance companies is attributable to legal fees.' In an
attempt to reduce costs and increase efficiency,2 some insurance companies have
moved from the use of a referral system' in insurance defense to the use of in-house
counsel.4 The use of in-house counsel has added another layer of ethical complexity
to insurance defense litigation. One Mississippi court has opined that the
relationship between counsel, the insurer, and the insured has created problems that
would "tax Socrates." 5
In 2006, the South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee issued an advisory
opinion that supported the use of in-house counsel in insurance defense litigation.6
As an advisory opinion, it is not binding authority in this state, but attorneys and
insurance companies may rely on this opinion to either commence or continue the
practice of employing in-house counsel. However, this reliance may be misplaced
because South Carolina statutory law prohibits the corporate practice of law.' In
addition to state statute, the South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct 5.4 (Rule
5.4) and 5.5 (Rule 5.5) require attorneys to maintain their professional

1. Susan Randall, Managed Litigation and the Professional Obligations of Insurance Defense
Lawyers, 51 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1, 1 (2001) (citing Milo Geyelin, Crossing the Bar: If You Think
Insurers Are Tight, Try Being One of Their Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1999, at Al). For example,
the "legal expenses of property-casualty insurers" quadrupled between 1978 and 1988. Id. (citations
omitted).
2. Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the EternalTriangle of Insurance Defense Ethics, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 475, 513 (1996).
3. When referring to a "referral system" in this Comment, the author means the practice of an
insurance company hiring an outside, independent attorney to represent the insured in defense of the
liability claim.
4. When referring to "in-house counsel" in this Comment, the author means the practice of using
attorneys that are salaried employees of the insurance company to defend liability claims against the
insured.
5. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d. 255, 273 (Miss. 1988).
6. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Op. 06-12 (2006), available at http://www.scbar.org/
member resources/ethics advisoryopinions/&id-641.
7. Id.
8. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-320 (2001).
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independence 9 and prohibit attorneys from practicing law in a manner that violates
any South Carolina state law.' The South Carolina Supreme Court has not
addressed whether the use of in-house counsel in insurance defense litigation is an
unauthorized practice of law; consequently, the court has not had the opportunity
to interpret the South Carolina statute or Rules of Professional Conduct as applied
to the use of in-house counsel. With the exception of South Carolina Code
section 40-5-320, which deals with the corporate practice of law generally," there
is no statutory authority that specifically regulates, approves of, or prohibits the
practice of in-house counsel in insurance defense litigation. This Comment argues
that, while the use of in-house counsel in South Carolina insurance defense
litigation does not violate Rule 5.4, which requires professional independence, the
South Carolina Supreme Court should ban the use of in-house counsel in insurance
defense litigation as the unauthorized practice of law under section 40-5-320 and
Rule 5.5. Further, the court should find any attorney representing an insured as inhouse counsel of an insurance company to be in violation of Rule 5.5 for aiding in
the unauthorized practice of law.
Part 11 of this Comment outlines the relevant South Carolina caselaw, as well
as the basics of insurance defense. Part 11 also discusses in detail the statutory
authority and the Rules of Professional Conduct that are implicated by the use of
in-house counsel, specifically South Carolina Code section 40-5-320 and Rules 5.4
and 5.5. Part 11 concludes with a brief history of the more traditional referral system
used in insurance defense litigation and explains how the restrictions placed on the
referral system have led some insurance companies to use in-house counsel instead.
Part I1I of this Comment analyzes the application of the state law discussed in
Part 11 to the use of in-house counsel. Specifically, it discusses whether the in-house
counsel system violates the professional independence requirement of Rule 5.4.
Based on ethics opinions from the American Bar Association and the South
Carolina Ethics Advisory Committee, as well as persuasive South Carolina caselaw,
Part II concludes that the use of in-house counsel does not violate Rule 5.4. Part
ITT then discusses whether the use of in-house counsel constitutes the unauthorized
practice of law by examining three opinions of other state supreme courts, which
discuss the predominant views of the propriety of using in-house counsel: the broad
permissive view, limited permission for insurance defense litigation, and a complete
prohibition on the use of in-house counsel. Part ITT concludes with a determination
that the South Carolina Supreme Court should prohibit the use of in-house counsel
because the use of in-house counsel by the insurer to represent the insured should
be deemed the corporate practice of law, which is specifically prohibited by South
Carolina statute. 12 Because the insurer is engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law, any attorney acting as in-house counsel to represent an insured should be
deemed to be aiding in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Rule 5.5.

9. S.C. APp. CT. R. 407, R. 5.4 (Supp. 2006).
10. Id. R. 5.5(a).
11. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-320.
12. See id.
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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

BACKGROUND

A.

The Referral System and Subsequent Shift to In-House Counsel

An analysis of the growing use of in-house counsel as a means of defending
insurance claims requires an explanation of the insurance industry's trend away
from the use of the referral system toward the use of in-house counsel. The referral
system is the most prevalent method by which insurance companies represent their
insureds. 3 However, the number of states that have had to address the issue of inhouse counsel 4 indicates that the practice is steadily increasing. 5
Under the referral system, once the insurer receives notice of a suit, it refers
any legal action against an insured to an independent law firm with attorneys
licensed to practice in South Carolina. 6 After counsel has been assigned, the insurer
will notify the insured and the retained counsel in writing.7 The attorney retained
to represent the insured will then contact the insured to conduct an initial interview
and provide an engagement letter setting forth the parameters of the attorney client
relationship. 8 This letter clarifies the nature of the attorney's relationship to the
insured and to the insurer and provides assurances that the attorney will keep the
insured informed through the remainder of the case. 9
The relationship formed between the insurer, insured, and counsel under the
referral system has been described in different ways, including phrases such as the
"tripartite relationship" 20 and the "dual client doctrine.",2' Courts have used these

13. Interview with Eric K. Englebardt, Partner, Turner Padget Graham & Laney P.A. in
Greenville, S.C. (Dec. 31, 2007).
14. See, e.g., Alaska Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 99-3 (1999), available at http://www.alaskabar.org/
index.cfm?ID-4880: Fla. Bar, Ethics Op. 93-8 (1994), availableat http://www.floridabar.org/ (follow
"Ethics Opinions" hyperlink then follow "List of Florida Ethics Opinions by Number" hyperlink; then
follow "93-8" hyperlink); Supreme Court of Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op.
95-14 (1995), available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/BOC/Advisory Opinions/1995/op /2095014.doc; S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 06-12 (2006), available at http://www.scbar.org/
member resources/ethics advisoryopinions/&id-641; W. Va. Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., Op. 99-01
(1999), available at http://www.wvbar.org/BARINFO/ODC/LEIS/99-Ol.pdf All of these advisory
opinions discuss the propriety of using in-house counsel in insurance defense litigation.
15. See Nancy J. Moore, The Ethical Duties of Insurance Defense Lawyers: Are SpecialSolutions
Required?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 259, 292 (1997) (citing Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys:
Unnecessary Casualtiesin the ContinuingBattle over the Law Governing InsuranceDefense Lawyers,
4 CONN. INS. L.J. 205, 237 (1997)); Richmond, supra note 2, at 512 (citing Ronald E. Mallen, Defense
by SalariedCounsel: A Bane or a Blessing?, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 518, 518 (1994)).
16. Interview with Eric K. Englebardt, supra note 13.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Richmond, supra note 2, at 476.
21. 1d. at 482.
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descriptions in their attempts to determine whether the counsel has one client22 or
two.2" Professor Nancy Moore has stated that neither the one-client nor the twoclient view works satisfactorily under the current Model Rules of Professional
Conduct but notes that "most courts and commentators seem willing to settle for
something less than 'ideal' compliance .. . ."24 Professor Moore also expresses
concern over the lack of guidance from the American Bar Association (ABA)2 5 but
concedes that "some 'flex in the joints' [is necessary] to accommodate the interests
of both insurers and insureds."26 Douglas Richmond also acknowledges that the
relationships formed under the referral system are permissible under a dual client
doctrine and that a dual client relationship can exist;27 however, he also notes that
the attorney ultimately represents the insured's interests and that the attorney's

22. See, e.g., Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Mich. 1991) (stating that the
relationship between the insurer and defense counsel is "less than a client-attorney relationship"); In
re Rules ofProf I Conduct, 2 P.3d 806, 814 (Mont. 2000) ("[U]nder the Rules ofProfessional Conduct
[of Montana], the insured is the sole client of defense counsel."); Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
715 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (stating that the insurer and defense counsel should
"understand that only the insuredis the client"); Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 91 (1993),
availableat http://www.cobar.org/index.cfth/ID/386/subID/1812/CETH/Ethics-Opinion-91 :-EthicalDuties-of-Attomey-Selected-by-Insurer-to-Represent-Insured,-0 116/93/("[T]he lawyer's client is the
insured and not the [insurer]."); Me. Prof'I Ethics Comm'n of the Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Op. 164
(1998), availableathttp://www.mebaroverseers.org/Ethics / 200pinions/Opinion / 20164.htm ("[E]ven
though the insurance company may be paying the cost of representation, the client is the insured and
not the [insurer]."); Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 195 (1999) (citations omitted), available at
http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/ethics/formalopinions/1 95.htm ("[L]egally and ethically[,] the client of
the lawyer is the insured.").
23. See, e.g., MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that
the attorney's clients were the insured and the insurer); Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices,
2 P.3d 663, 668 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that an attorney may represent both the insurer and the
insured, "absent an actual or apparent conflict of interest"), vacated on other grounds, 24 P.3d 593
(Ariz. 2001); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 24 (Ct. App. 1999)
(citation omitted) ("[T]he attorney represents two clients, the insured and the insurer."); Unigard Ins.
Group v. O'Flaherty & Belgum, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 565, 569 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that absent an
actual or apparent conflict of interest, "the attorney has a dual attorney-client relationship with both
insurer and insured"); Nandorf, Inc. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 479 N.E.2d 988, 991 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) ("The
attorney hired by the insurance company to defend in an action against the insured owes fiduciary duties
to two clients: the insurer and the insured."); Gray v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 468 A.2d 721, 725
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) ("[A] defense lawyer is counsel to both the insurer and the insured.");
see also Scott L. Machanic, Insurance Defense Counsel: Who is the Client?, 43 FED'N INS. & CORP.
COUNS. Q. 45, 51 (1992) (stating that an attorney client relationship exists between counsel and
insurer).
24. Moore, supra note 15, at 260.
25. Id. at 270 73 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-403
(1996)) (noting the lack ofresolution by the ABA as to whether in-house counsel represents the insured,
or both the insured and the insurer); see also Randall, supra note 1, at 12 (noting that the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct and Model Rules of Professional Responsibility are silent as to whether inhouse counsel represents only the insured, or both the insured and the insurer).
26. Moore, supra note 15, at 302; see also Randall, supra note 1, at 3 4 (stating that when both
the insurer and insured are considered clients, "the Model Rules of Professional Conduct permit a
lawyer to accept direction, including direction aimed at minimizing costs, from the client insurer").
27. Richmond, supra note 2, at 482.
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actions should further those interests. 28 When applied to the use of in-house
counsel, the determination of whether the attorney has one or two clients becomes
less important. The more important determination is whether the corporation is
practicing law. Thus, the Rules of Professional Conduct do not invalidate the use
of in-house counsel; the statutory ban on the corporate practice of law does.29
In 2001, the ABA released a formal opinion that addressed the issue of an
attorney's professional independence in the context of insurance defense
litigation.3" The opinion concluded that an attorney hired by an insurance company
to represent its insured "must not permit the [insurer] to require compliance with
litigation management guidelines... [that] will compromise materially the lawyer's
professional judgment."'" Numerous state bar associations have come to the same
conclusion: while an insurance company can require compliance with various
administrative guidelines, the degree of control exercised cannot affect the
substantive representation of the insured.3 The limitations on the degree of control
that may be exerted by insurance companies has resulted in a new method of
representation of the insured: the use of in-house counsel. From the point of view
of insurance companies, the use of in-house counsel provides greater control over
the conduct of the representation 33 and its associated cost and allows them to defend
claims in a more cost-efficient manner.34 From the point of view of the attorney

28. Id. at535.
29. See discussion infra Part III.C.
30. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof IResponsibility, Formal Op. 01-421 (2001).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Ala. State Bar Office of the Gen. Counsel, Op. 1998-02 (1998), available at
http://www.alabar.org/ogc/fopDisplay.cfn?oneld=2 (stating that the attorney should not allow the
insurer's guidelines to impair the attorney's professional independence once representation of the
insured begins); State Bar of Cal. Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1995-139
(1995), available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/html-unclassified/ca95-139.html (finding that
when a conflict of interest arises between the insurer and the insured, the issue should be resolved in
favor of the insured, regardless of the terms of the insurance contract); Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Prof'l Ethics, Informal Op. 92-07 (1992) ("[T]he lawyer owes undivided loyalty to the insured, and
should conduct a full and competent defense ... disregarding the influence of [the insurer]."); Iowa
Supreme Court Bd. of Prof l Ethics and Conduct, Op. 99-01 (1999), available at
http://www. iowabar.org/ethics.nsf(follow "Iowa Board ofProfessional Ethics Opinion" hyperlink; then
follow "09/08/1999" hyperlink) ("[l]t
would be improper for [a] lawyer to agree to, accept or follow
Guidelines which seek to direct, control or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment...."); Supreme
Court of Ohio Bd. of Conum'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2000-3 (2000), available at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/BOC/Advisory Opinions/2000/op 0/ 2000-003.doc (concluding that it is
improper for an attorney to follow insurance company guidelines pertaining to representation of the
insured if those guidelines interfere with the attorney's professional judgment and independence); Va.
State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1723 (1998), available at http://www.vacle.org/opinions/
1723.TXT (finding that it would be "ethically impermissible for an attorney to agree to an insurance
carrier's restrictions on the attorney's representation of the insured"); Randall, supra note 1, at9
("[L]awyers should not agree in advance to adhere to litigation standards without some provision
recognizing that the lawyer's professional obligations supercede the standards in case of conflict.").
33. See Moore, supra note 15, at 296 97 (stating that an insurer can exercise a greater degree of
control over in-house counsel as opposed to independent counsel).
34. See Richmond, supra note 2: Silver, supra note 15, at 241-42 (finding that firms' legal
expenses and settlements were lower under an in-house counsel system as opposed to areferral system).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2008

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 11

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59: 615

employed as in-house counsel, the insurance company is able to exercise a greater
degree of control over the attorney. 5 While the insurance company likely prefers
the use of in-house counsel, the company runs the risk of engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law.36 Further, the practice exposes the attorney to greater
scrutiny under Rule 5.4 and other provisions regarding confidentiality and conflicts
of interest."
B. Rules of ProfessionalConduct and State Law Implicating the Use of InHouse Counsel
While an attorney is bound by all the Rules of Professional Conduct when
representing a client, 8 the area of insurance defense litigation requires special
attention to Rules 5.4 and 5.5, which address, respectively, professional
independence and the unauthorized practice of law. These rules also have a
significant impact with respect to two specific issues: (1) whether the control over
in-house counsel by the insurance company violates Rule 5.4 and (2) whether the
insurance company has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of
South Carolina Code section 40-5-320.
The professional independence of a lawyer that Rule 5.4 seeks to protect is
often at risk of being impaired in insurance defense litigation. Rule 5.4 states that
"[a] lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the
lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's
professional judgment in rendering such legal services."39 Rule 5.4 is different from
other provisions implicated by insurance defense litigation because the rule
contains no exception or process whereby waiver is authorized. Other provisions42
4
40
regulating issues such as confidentiality, conflicts, ' and scope of representation
provide for exceptions to the rule as long as there is disclosure by the attorney and
consent by the client.43 Rule 5.4 does not provide for such an exception, foreclosing
any possibility that an attorney may not be bound by the basic rule. The comments
to this rule explain that the presence of a third party payor-the insurer-should not
affect the professional judgment of a lawyer. 44 Rule 5.4 also addresses a lawyer's
representation of a corporation's clients; in the case of insurance defense litigation,

35. See Moore, supra note 15, at 296-97.
36. See discussion infra Part II.B.
37. See infra notes 39 47 and accompanying text.
38. S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, R. 5.2(a).
39. Id. R. 5.4(c).
40. Id. R. 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client
unless the client gives informed consent .... ").
41. Id. R. 1.8(a) ("A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction ... adverse to the client
unless ... the client is advised in writing ... and ... the client gives informed consent .... ").
42. Id. R. 1.2(c) ("A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is
reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.").
43. See sources cited supranotes 40-42.
44. S.C. APp. CT. R. 407, R. 5.4 cmt. I (noting that any arrangement between a lawyer and the
lawyer's employer "does not modify the lawyer's obligation to the client").
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the corporation's client is the insured. Rule 5.4 prohibits lawyers from practicing
in a corporation if "a nonlawyer owns any interest [of the corporation], 45 "a
nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer[,]" 46 or "a nonlawyer has the right to
direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer. 47 Not only does Rule 5.4
heavily regulate and restrict the corporate practice of law and the use of in-house
counsel generally, it also implicates the use of independent counsel to represent the
insured. Presumably, independent counsel would also be required to maintain
professional independence from the insurance company.
Rule 5.5 deals with the unauthorized practice of law and, as applied to
insurance defense litigation, seeks to proscribe any actions by an attorney that aid
in the unauthorized practice of law. Rule 5.5 states that "[a] lawyer shall not
practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession
in that jurisdiction. ' , 48 While Rule 5.5 largely deals with the practice of law by
attorneys that are not admitted to the South Carolina Bar,4" the provision quoted
above would also apply to in-house counsel if a court determined that the use of inhouse counsel violated any other state law. The most relevant South Carolina
statute is South Carolina Code section 40-5-320, which prohibits the practice of law
by corporations.5 1 When read together, Rule 5.5 and section 40-5-320 present a
major obstacle to any insurer seeking to employ in-house counsel in South
Carolina.
111.

THE INTERPRETATION

OF RULE

5.4

IN SOUTH CAROLINA

AND OTHER

JURISDICTIONS

A.

Application of Rule 5.4 to the In-House Counsel System of Insurance
Defense

While Rule 5.4 does not specifically prohibit the use of in-house counsel to
represent insureds, the degree of control that can be exercised by the insurer over
the in-house counsel may be limited by Rule 5.4.51 Under the more traditional
referral system, the attorney runs less of a risk of violating Rule 5.4 because the
attorney is not employed by the insurance company and the attorney must
ultimately answer to the partners of the law firm, who must also abide by the
restrictions of Rule 5.4. Under the in-house counsel system, acting in accordance

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
"practice

Id.R. 5.4(d)(1).
Id.R. 5.4(d)(2).
Id.R. 5.4(d)(3).
Id.R. 5.5(a).
See id. R. 5.5(b) (d).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-320 (2001). This statute makes itunlawful for a corporation to
or appear as an attorney atlaw for a person other than itself' or "hold itself out to the public
as being entitled to practice law, render or furnish legal services, advise or furnish attorneys or counsel,
or render legal services in actions or proceedings." Id. § 40-5-320(A)(1), (3). Violation of this section
constitutes a misdemeanor and is punishable by a discretionary fine, up to three years imprisonment,
or both. Id.§ 40-5-320(B).
51. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
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with Rule 5.4 becomes more difficult because the attorney is a direct employee of
the insurance company and likely works for a nonlawyer. 52 This Part discusses how
the application of Rule 5.4 is different under the in-house system than under the
referral system and how the application to in-house counsel may lead to a violation
of Rule 5.4. The South Carolina Supreme Court likely will allow the use of inhouse counsel if the court limits its analysis solely to Rule 5.4. While compliance
with the rule is more difficult under the in-house system, an attorney faces the same
ethical dilemma of maintaining professional independence under either the referral
system or the in-house system.
1. Guidance Providedby the ABA and the South CarolinaBar
The most important influence on South Carolina's interpretation of Rule 5.4
has been the ABA's formal opinion on the use of in-house counsel in insurance
defense litigation. 53 In its opinion, the ABA concluded that the use of in-house
counsel is permissible as long as there is disclosure by the attorney and the attorney
exercises independent judgment.5 4 The ABA also found that a majority of
jurisdictions approve of the use of in-house counsel 55 and noted that proper
representation is possible because "once the client-lawyer relationship attaches, the
rules of professional responsibility, not the insurance contract
or the lawyer's
' 6
employer, govern the lawyer's ethical obligations to clients. 1
Consistent with the ABA's findings, the South Carolina Ethics Advisory
Committee released an opinion determining that the use of in-house counsel by an
insurer is not a violation of Rule 5.4.57 The opinion states in relevant part that "once
a case is selected and assigned to the lawyer, the [insurer] may not interfere with

52. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Embracing Descent: The Bankruptcy of a Business Paradigmfor
Conceptualiingand Regulatingthe Legal Profession, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 63, 105-06 (1999)
(recognizing that in-house counsel run a greater risk of violating ethical obligations than their
independently retained counterparts, especially the obligation to maintain their professional
independence, because "[b]eing a good lawyer[] to the client... may not be in the in-house attorney's
best job interests").
53. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 03-430 (2003).
54. Id.at 1.
55. Id. at3 n.9 (citations omitted).
56. Id.at2 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-403 (1996)).
57. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 06-12 (2006), available at http://www.scbar.org/
member/opinion.asp?opinionlD-641. The opinion states as follows:
In determining whether the organization is attempting to direct, regulate, or
interfere with the lawyer-client relationship, a distinction should be drawn
between general organizational policies that identify the types of cases for which
the organization is willing to provide representation and the strategy for handling
particular cases. The [insurer] may properly establish policies that define the types
of cases for which the organization will provide legal services, but once a case is
selected and assigned to the lawyer, the [insurer] may not interfere with the
objectives, strategy, or tactics for handling the cases. These matters are
determined exclusively by the client and lawyer pursuant to the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
Id. (quoting S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 02-04 (2002)).
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the objectives, strategy, or tactics for handling the cases."58 Similar to the opinion
of the ABA, the South Carolina opinion implies that as long as attorneys comply
with South Carolina's Rules of Professional Conduct-particularly the provision
requiring preservation of the attorney's professional independence-the mere fact
that the attorney is an employee of the insurer does not alone constitute the
unauthorized practice of law.59
A cursory reading of the South Carolina opinion offers comfort to both the
insurer using in-house counsel and the attorney employed by the insurer. Upon
closer examination, however, the opinion apparently expresses serious reservations
about an insurer using in-house counsel. While the opinion approves of the use of
in-house counsel generally, it also requires the attorney to maintain professional
independence as required by Rule 5.4, putting insurers in an interesting position.60
Insurers have increasingly begun using in-house counsel as a method of controlling
the cost of litigation,6' including limiting an attorney's ability to conduct research,
file certain motions, and hire expert witnesses; insurers may also prohibit these
practices altogether.62 Thus, it is difficult for an insurer to comply with the ethics
opinion, allowing its in-house counsel to exercise professional independence but
still control litigation costs, which is a major advantage of the in-house counsel
system. The result of allowing an attorney to maintain professional judgment is an
in-house attorney who performs the job in a similar fashion to an attorney hired
under the referral system. The opinion also puts the attorney in an interesting
position. If an attorney, as a condition of employment, attempts to secure
professional independence through a written agreement, the insurer may not be
willing to hire the attorney.63 While this opinion provides some direction, it fails to
provide a clear answer as to whether the use of in-house counsel is an unauthorized

58. Id.
59. Id.; see also S.C. App. CT. R. 407, R. 1.8 cmt. 11 (Supp. 2006) (implying approval of the
referral system in which the insurer acts as a third party payor on behalf of the insured as long as the
attorney believes "that there will be no interference with the lawyer's independent professional
judgment."). In a separate opinion, the South Carolina Ethics Advisory Committee endorsed the use of
in-house counsel for non-profit organizations, as long as the attorney maintains his professional
independence during the course of the representation in accordance with Rule 5.4. S.C. Bar Ethics
Advisory Comm., Op. 02-04 (2002), available at http://www.scbar.org/member/
opinion.asp?opinionl D-565.
60. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 06-12 (2006).
61. See Richmond, supra note 2, at 513 ("Salaried counsel are simply less expensive than outside
counsel charging by the hour. Efficient claims handling can also reduce insurers' costs. Theoretically,
staff counsel can handle claims more efficiently by learning the particular liability lines the insurer
writes and repeatedly applying that knowledge to claims in volume.").
62. See Randall, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that guidelines such as "Standard Procedures for
Outside Counsel," "Litigation Management Guidelines," and "Retention Policies" often "require the
lawyer to obtain approval before performing various legal services, including staffing decisions,
research exceeding a specified number of hours .... selection and retention of experts, filing of
motions, and in-firm conferences").
63. A more interesting question, outside the scope of this Comment, is whether an insurer can
terminate in-house counsel if the attorney takes actions that comply with the Rules of Professional
Conduct but not with the insurer's guidelines.
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practice of law. Thus, it is necessary to examine the treatment of in-house counsel
by the judiciary.
2.

JudicialApplication of Rule 5.4 in South Carolina

The South Carolina Supreme Court has not yet addressed the use of in-house
counsel by an insurer. However, a South Carolina federal district court has dealt
with the application of Rule 5.4 in the context of insurance defense litigation. In
Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. Ben Arnold-Sunbelt Beverage Co. of South
Carolina,4 the court predicted that the South Carolina Supreme Court likely would
not create a "per se disqualification rule" that would prohibit the representation of
the insured by an independent attorney hired by the insurer under the referral
system. 6 In Twin City, the insured would not allow the attorney retained on his
behalf by the insurance company to represent him based on the assumption that a
per se conflict of interest existed or likely would exist in the future because of a
reservation of rights asserted by the insurer.66 Specifically, the insured believed that
the attorney would intentionally favor the insurance company by failing to
vigorously defend any potential uncovered claims. 67 The court declined to create
a per se disqualification rule because such a rule would imply that when faced with
a possible ethical dilemma, the attorney hired by the insurer would always choose
to violate established ethical standards and act in the best interest of the insurer
rather than the insured.68
Underlying the court's holding is the belief that an attorney will always strive
to act in accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 5.4,
even in the context of insurance defense litigation.69 One possible reason for the
federal district court's refusal to create a per se rule is that it believed that the South
Carolina Supreme Court would want to analyze each possible violation of Rule 5.4
individually. This preference for case-by-case, fact-intensive review is the reason
why use of the referral system of insurance defense litigation is not a per se
violation of Rule 5.4. Therefore, assuming that this ruling of the district court in
Twin City is an accurate prediction of how the South Carolina Supreme Court
would rule, presumably, the South Carolina Supreme Court would also find that use
of in-house counsel by insurers is not a per se violation of Rule 5.4. This

64. 336 F. Supp. 2d 610 (D.S.C. 2004).
65. Id. at 615. The court expressly acknowledged that the South Carolina Supreme Court "has not
directly addressed the legal issues raised in this case" but acknowledged that it"must apply the law that
it conscientiously believes would have been applied in the state
court system." Id. at 612 (quoting 19
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 4507, at 126 (2d ed. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Id. at613. A reservation of rights is "a unilateral statement by an insurer in writing notifying
the insured of its intention to continue with the defense while retaining the right to press all issues that
could lead to a finding of non-coverage." Id.at 612 n.3 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1082 (7th
ed. 1999)).
67. Id. at613.
68. Id. at614-15.
69. See id. at 615.
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assumption is reasonable because the attorney's professional independence will be
threatened under either a referral system or an in-house system, as the insurer can
exercise control over the attorney in either system. However, this assumption
arguably ignores an important fact: the attorney, as in-house counsel, is an actual
employee of the insurance company.70 Thus, the attorney's professional
independence should be guarded more vigorously under the in-house system.
B.

Three Views RegardingWhether the Use ofIn-House Counsel Constitutes
the UnauthorizedPracticeof Law

As concluded previously, the South Carolina Supreme Court likely would not
find use of in-house counsel by insurers to be a per se violation of Rule 5.4.
However, there are still two areas of South Carolina law that affect the in-house
counsel system. First, Rule 5.5 prohibits an attorney from participating in a practice
of law that is "in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that
jurisdiction."'" Secondly, section 40-5-320 of the South Carolina Code prohibits the
practice of law by corporations "for a person other than itself.'' 72 The court's
interpretation and application of Rule 5.5 and section 40-5-320 will ultimately
determine whether an insurance company is participating in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Unlike South Carolina, other state supreme courts have already addressed
whether use of in-house counsel constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. A
review of the decisions by these other courts reveals ajurisdictional split regarding
the treatment of the in-house counsel. The diverging views can be grouped into
three categories: broad acceptance of the use of in-house counsel and the corporate
practice of law, limited permission of the use of in-house counsel solely for
insurance defense litigation, and complete prohibition on the use of in-house
counsel.
1.

The Broad Permissive View

The broad permissive view essentially holds that insurance companies are not
engaged in the corporate practice of law, and therefore, use of an in-house counsel
system is permissible. States that have a statutory ban on the corporate practice of
law have used this ban to strengthen Rule 5.5. However, if a court rules that an
insurer's use of in-house counsel does not qualify as the corporate practice of law,
then any statutory ban will not apply. For example, the Missouri Supreme Court
held in In re Allstate Insurance Company73 that an insurance company was not
engaged in "the practice of law" or the "law business" under a system where its in-

70.
"lawyers
71.
72.
73.

See Stempel, supra note 51, at 41 (noting that the system of in-house counsel has made
less autonomous, perhaps to a degree that violates the professional paradigm").
S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, R. 5.5 (Supp. 2006).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-320(A)(1) (2001).
722 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
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house attorneys represented the insureds.74 In Allstate, the Missouri Advisory
Committee brought an action against an insurer alleging a violation of state law
which prohibited the practice of law by a corporation7 5 and a violation of the state's
Rules of Professional Conduct.76 The Missouri statute prohibiting the practice of
law by corporations is similar to the South Carolina statute prohibiting the
practice." Both state statutes prohibit the corporate practice of law but use slightly
different language. The Missouri statute is more general because its language
prohibits the practice of law by a corporation unless that corporation is a
professional corporation, limited liability company, or a limited liability partnership
organized and registered pursuant to specific Missouri statutes. In other words, the
corporation must be a law firm to engage in the practice of law. The South Carolina
statute is more specific because it states without qualification that no corporation
may practice law for any person or entity "other than itself."79 In addition, the
attorneys in Missouri and South Carolina operate under the nearly identical Rules
of Professional Conduct. 0 Thus, an analysis of Rule 5.5 as applied to the Missouri
statute likely would produce the same conclusion as an analysis of the rule in South
Carolina, if a South Carolina court adopted a similar broad permissive view
regarding the use of in-house counsel.
The Allstate court compared the use of in-house counsel to the use of referral
systems and found no difference between the two." The court reasoned that if an
insurer using the referral system is not engaged in the practice of law, then an
insurer using in-house counsel is also not engaged in the practice of law. 2 This
reasoning by the court seems contradictory, as noted by Justice Rendlen's dissent.
Justice Rendlen rejected the reasoning of the majority and stated that the majority's
broad holding that a corporation does not engage in the practice of law if it uses
in-house counsel to represent its insureds'-essentially abolishes the state statute
and opens the door for any corporation to employ attorneys to represent its

74. Id. at 951 (citing Mo. ANN. STAT. § 484.010(1) (2) (West 2004)).
75. Id. at 948-51 (citing Mo. ANN. STAT. § 484.020). Section 484.020 prohibits any "person[,]
... association, partnership, limited liability company or corporation" from engaging in "the practice
of law" or doing "law business." Id. § 484.020(1). Violation of this prohibition constitutes a
misdemeanor that is punishable by fine or civil suit. Id. § 484.020(2).

76. Allstate, 722 S.W.2d at 951 (citing Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rs. 4-1.7, 4-5.4 (1986)).
77. Compare Mo. ANN. STAT. § 484.020(1) (prohibiting any "person[,] ... association,

partnership, limited liability company or corporation" from engaging in "the practice of law" or doing
"law business"), with S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-320 (2001) (making it unlawful for a corporation to
"practice or appear as an attorney at law for a person other than itself' or "hold itself out to the public
as being entitled to practice law, render or furnish legal services, advise or furnish attorneys or counsel,
or render legal services in actions or proceedings").
78. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 484.020.
79. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-320(A)(1) (2001).
80. Compare Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4 (1986) (adopting almost verbatim the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct), with S.C. APP. CT. R. 407 (Supp. 2006) (same).

81. Allstate, 722 S.W.2d at 950.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 951.
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customers.84 The majority in Allstate also based its decision on the rulings of
several jurisdictions permitting the use of in-house counsel.85 However, Justice
Rendlen pointed out that those jurisdictions either did not have statutory
prohibitions against corporations practicing law or had enacted a statutory
exception for insurance companies.86
The holding by the majority in Allstate seems untenable based on the specific
facts of the case. Where a state legislature has expressly prohibited a corporation
from practicing law, a ruling that directly contradicts that statute indicates that the
judiciary is legislating from the bench and is intruding on the authority of the
legislature. In holding an insurer's use of in-house counsel to represent the insured
did not constitute the practice of law at all,87 the court avoided the discussion of
whether the use of in-house counsel constituted the unauthorized practice of law.
Thus, the court arguably misinterpreted the prohibition on the corporate practice of
law.
2.

Creation of an Insurance Defense Exception

While some state legislatures have enacted a statutory ban on the corporate
practice of law, other states prohibit the practice under common law but have
chosen to create common law exceptions to the general rule. CincinnatiInsurance
Co. v. Wills88 involved a personal injury action brought by two plaintiffs who had
been injured by the insured.89 Once the injured parties learned that in-house counsel
was representing the insured, they moved to have the insured's counsel
disqualified.90 Cincinnati Insurance moved to intervene and become a party to the
action to effectively defend its use of in-house counsel.' Unlike inAllstate, Indiana
did not have a statutory ban on the corporate practice of law. 2 Rather, Indiana's
ban on the corporate practice of law stemmed from the state's Rules of Professional
Conduct, specifically Rule 5.4,93 and state common law.94 Based on this precedent

84. Id. at 953 (Rendlen, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 950-51 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 954 55 (Rendlen, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 951 (majority opinion).
88. 717 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. 1999).
89. Id. at 153.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 156.
93. Id. at 156-57 (citing IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1998)). Indiana, like South
Carolina, has substantially adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See generally, Donald
R. Lundberg & Charles M. Kidd, You Say You Want an Evolution": An Overview of the Ethics 2000
Amendments to the Indiana Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 38 IND. L. REV. 1255 (2005) (discussing
Indiana's recent adoption of amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct); Am. Bar Ass'n,
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Dates of Adoption, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/
alpha states.html (noting that Indiana adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct on November
25, 1986).
94. Cincinnati,717 N.E.2d at 157-58 (citing David Gleber, Attorney andClient Unauthorifed
Practiceof Law, 13 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 289, 290 (1938)).
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and the premise that insurers and insureds have similar interests, 95 the court held
that use of an in-house counsel system did not constitute the unauthorized practice
of law and that an attorney employed as in-house counsel did not aid in the
unauthorized practice of law.96 The court also relied on agency theory to justify the
insurer's use of in-house counsel to represent the insured in legal proceedings. 97
Finally, the court reasoned that because the Rules of Professional Conduct did not
expressly prohibit the use of in-house counsel, the practice should be permitted to
continue unless and until the state's citizens decide otherwise. 98 Thus, the effect of
the court's ruling was to create a common law exception for the use of in-house
counsel in insurance defense litigation.
The Cincinnati court's conclusion seems an acceptable resolution to the
problem of in-house counsel. By otherwise affirming the common law prohibition
against the corporate practice of law, 99 the court limited its holding to the use of inhouse counsel in insurance defense litigation, noting that "there may be many other
reasons why an employee-attorney may not concurrently represent both the
employer and someone else, but the attorney's status as an employee of an
insurance company or any other legal entity is in and of itself no bar."' 0 The
court's only obstacle was the common law it had fashioned, and the court had a
right to alter the law in order to reach an equitable resolution.' While the language
of Rule 5.4 is helpful in resolving this issue, whether the use of in-house counsel
violates Rule 5.4 does not provide an absolute answer and the issue must be
resolved on a case-by-case basis."0 2 The only possible flaw in the court's decision
is its reasoning that the insured and the insurer have similar interests.103 Based on
this statement, corporations besides insurance companies may now be able to argue
that the similar interests of their clients justify their use of in-house counsel.
However, as long as the rule remains grounded in the common law, courts can
freely address specific situations as they arise.

95. Id.at 160.
96. Id. at153.

97. Id.
at 160 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 19 cmt. d (1958)) ("[W]here the law
requires a [licensed professional], agency doctrine permits an unlicensed legal entity to employ licensed
agents to perform those acts requiring a license.").
98. Id.at163. The court noted as follows:
But this potential [for conflicts of interest] does not require the abandonment of
mode of doing business that the insurer finds efficient and cost effective, and the
insured knowingly accepts. Presumably[,] ultimately the marketplaces of ideas
and premium charges will sort this out and strike a balance between claimed cost
advantages and perceived desirability of wholly independent counsel.

Id.
99. Id.at160.
100. Id.
101. See Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 594 (Ind. 1992) ("[I]t
is the traditional role of the
highest court of a state to determine [the state's] common law... even if such determination results in
an innovative growth of the common law.").
102. See discussion supra Part Ill.A.2.
103. Cincinnati,717 N.E.2d at 160.
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3.

Complete Prohibitionon the Use of In-House Counsel

There are still other states that have a statutory ban on the corporate practice
of law and whose supreme courts have chosen to enforce the statutes as written. In
Gardner v. North Carolina State Bar, °4 the North Carolina Supreme Court
reviewed a state statute that prohibited the practice of law by a corporation'0 5 and
held that the use of in-house counsel by the insurer constituted the unauthorized
practice of law.' 06 In Gardner,the petitioner was in-house counsel for Nationwide
Insurance Company °7 and sought review of two state bar ethics opinions stating
that the use of in-house counsel by the insurer amounted to the unauthorized
practice of law. °8 In affirming the conclusions of the ethics opinions, 109 the court
disagreed with the petitioner's "similarity of interest" argument that there was no
unauthorized practice of law because the corporation was appearing and
representing itself in its defense of the insured." 0 The court severely criticized this
reasoning, stating that because the attorney was acting in his official capacity as an
employee of the corporation, the "acts [of the attorney] would thereby be the acts
of [the corporation] itself."'. The court went on to point out that "[t]he company
itself is not the party to the action," and "[a]ny judgments rendered are rendered
against the insured, not against the company.""' 2 Furthermore, the court responded
to the holdings of several other courts" 3 in finding that "the interests of the
insurance company and the insured [are not] identical."' '4The court distinguished
the case at bar from the persuasive authority cited by the petitioner, noting that
those jurisdictions had statutes that created exceptions for insurance companies or
had no statutory ban on the corporate practice of law at all." 5 Thus, the court

104. 341 S.E.2d 517 (N.C. 1986).
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-5 (2007). The statute prohibits any corporation, by itself or through an
agent, from practicing law, appearing in court on behalf of any person, giving legal advice, drafting
legal documents, or otherwise holding "itself out in any manner as being entitled to do any of the
foregoing acts." Id. § 84-5(a). However, the statute does allow for attorneys to be retained by a
corporation to represent the corporation "in any matter arising in connection with the course and scope
of employment." Id § 84-5(b).
106. Gardner, 341 S.E.2d at 522 23. While the court limited its analysis of the issue to the
application of the state statute, the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct are substantially
similar to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and thus similar to the South Carolina Rules of
Professional Conduct. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Model Rules of Professional Conduct-Dates of Adoption,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha states.html (noting that North Carolina and South Carolina
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct on October 7, 1985, and January 9, 1990,
respectively). Compare N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2006), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT (2000), and S.C. APp. CT. R. 407 (Supp. 2006).
107. Id. at 518 n.1.
108. Id. at 518.
109. Id. at 523.
110. Id. at 520-21.
111. Id. at 520.
112. Id. at 521.
113. Id. at 521-22 (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 521.
115. Id. at 522 (citations omitted).
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applied its own state law, which expressly prohibited the corporate practice of law,
in accordance with "the16policies expressed by [its] state legislature and the best
interests of [its] state."''
Both Missouri and North Carolina had similar, if not identical, statutes
prohibiting the practice of law by corporations," as well as similar Rules of
Professional Conduct. 18 However, the Allstate and Gardner courts came to
opposite conclusions. The simplicity of the court's reasoning in Gardnerwarrants
a strong following by states with similar prohibitions on the corporate practice of
law. Unlike the Allstate court,' the Gardnercourt did not indulge in discussion of
the legislature's intent or determine that the legislature did not contemplate
insurance defense litigation in its drafting of the statute. Nor did the Gardnercourt
try to determine whether the use of in-house counsel creates a per se conflict of
interest, or whether the insurer violated Rule 5.4 by restricting the attorney's
professional independence."' The Gardnercourt saw the issue more directly: by
utilizing in-house counsel to represent the insured, was the insurer practicing law
in violation of the corporate practice of law statute?' 2' To the court, the answer was
simple: "Since a corporation cannot practice law directly, it cannot do so indirectly
by employing lawyers to practice for it."' 22
As demonstrated by the three different views taken by courts, there is no clear
answer as to whether the use of in-house counsel constitutes the unauthorized
practice of law. Each state's determination relied on factors unique to each case: the
Rules of Professional Conduct utilized by the state, the existence of a statutory ban
on the corporate practice of law, and the specific factual circumstances. While this
Comment does not intend to recommend a rule for all states, these cases do help
advise which approach South Carolina should adopt regarding the use of in-house
counsel in insurance defense litigation.
C. Which Approach Should South CarolinaAdopt?
When the issue is finally addressed in this state, the South Carolina Supreme
Court should follow the North Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in Gardnerand
completely prohibit the use of in-house counsel. Based on the plain language of

116. Id.
117. Compare Mo. ANN. STAT. § 484.020 (West 2004), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-5 (2007).
118. Compare MO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4 (1995), with N.C. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT

(2006).

119. In re Allstate Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Mo. 1987).
120. But see id at 951-53 (discussing issues of conflict of interest and professional
independence).
121. Gardner, 341 S.E.2d at 520. The court saw the dispositive issues as "whether the [insurer]
would be making an appearance at all" and "whether [the appearance by the insurer] would be a
prohibited one." Id.
122. Id. at 521 (quoting Seawell v. Carolina Motor Club, 184 S.E. 540, 544 (N.C. 1936)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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section 40-5-320,123 application of Rule 5.5,124 and the reasoning of the court in
Gardner,25 the South Carolina Supreme Court should prohibit this practice and
deem any attorney employed as in-house counsel to be aiding in the unauthorized
practice of law. This conclusion is based on the similarity between North Carolina
law to South Carolina law. Like North Carolina, South Carolina has substantially
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1 26 which means that Rule 5.5
requires the same ethical obligations for attorneys in either state. Also, both states
have an unambiguous statutory ban on the corporate practice of law 1 27 that deserves
the enforcement of the court.
South Carolina has had a statutory ban on the corporate practice of law for over
fifty-five years. 128 The language of the 1952 statute is strikingly similar to the
language of section 40-5-320, the current statute addressing the corporate practice
of law. The existence of a virtually unchanged statutory ban on the corporate
practice of law in South Carolina for the last fifty-five years strongly indicates that
the South Carolina legislature does not want to grant corporations the ability to
represent any person other than themselves in court. As the court in Gardner
reasoned, "the acts [of the attorney] would thereby be the acts of [the insurer]
itself.' ' 1 29 Ifthe South Carolina Supreme Court views in-house counsel as acting on
behalf of the insurer, then the actions of the insurer and in-house counsel should be
prohibited by section 40-5-320.
The South Carolina Supreme Court may consider holding in accordance with
the Cincinnaticourt and carve out a specific insurance exception for the use of inhouse counsel. 3 The creation of such an exception could be based on economic
efficiency: use of in-house counsel reduces costs for the insurer' and thus, leads
to lower premiums paid by South Carolina residents. The court could also create an
exception because, as a common practice, the use of an in-house counsel system
likely has worked to the satisfaction of the insured based on the lack of litigation
of the issue. 3 2 While these are valid justifications for creating an exception, the
Cincinnaticourt's reasoning should not be followed because there was no statutory

123. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-320 (2001).
124. S.C. App. CT. R. 407, R. 5.5 (Supp. 2006).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 104 16, 121 22.
126. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Model Rules of Professional Conduct-Dates of Adoption,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha states.html (noting that South Carolina adopted the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct on January 9, 1990).
127. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-5 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-320.
128. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-142(a) (b) (1952). The statute provided,
It shall be unlawful for any corporation or voluntary association to practice or
appear as an attorney at law for any person other than itself in any court in this
State or before any judicial body, [or] to make it a business to practice as an
attorney atlaw for any person other than itself, in any of such courts ....
Id.
129. Gardner v. N.C. State Bar, 341 S.E.2d 517, 520 (N.C. 1986).
130. See supra notes 94 98 and accompanying text.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
132. A search of South Carolina caselaw on Westlaw using the search terms in-house counsel,
insurance, and professionalconduct resulted in no state court opinions.
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ban on the corporate practice of law in that case. In Cincinnati,the prohibition was
a common law prohibition, so the court was free to create a common law
exception.' 33 In South Carolina, the prohibition on the corporate practice of law is
based on statute, not common law. Therefore, if there is to be an exception in South
Carolina for the use of in-house counsel in insurance defense litigation, it should
be created by the same branch of government that created the general statutory
prohibition: the state legislature.
If the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the Missouri
Supreme Court in Allstate and permitted the use of in-house counsel because
insurance companies do not practice law,'34 there would be far-reaching negative
implications on the practice of law in South Carolina. If the South Carolina
Supreme Court reached the same conclusion as the Allstate court, it would
effectively repeal section 40-5-320. Corporations could start practicing law by
representing their customers in court and creating legal departments in each of their
South Carolina corporate locations to represent customers on various legal issues.
Such developments would have implications that are beyond the scope of this
Comment but include adverse effects on small firms and solo practitioners and
convoluted applications of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
IV. CONCLUSION

Insurance defense litigation presents unique issues regarding the ethical
obligations for attorneys practicing in South Carolina. The primary concern is
maintaining the professional independence of the attorney in order to ensure that
every insured gets the best representation possible. However, insurers have an
understandable desire to keep litigation expenses down. Policies like the use of inhouse counsel that further this goal allow insurers to pass the savings on to South
Carolina residents in the form of lower premiums and greater benefits. While
improved service at a lower cost is an attractive goal, the progress towards that goal
cannot involve a policy that violates existing state law. South Carolina statutory law
currently prohibits the corporate practice of law, and this ban arguably prevents
insurers from using in-house counsel to represent their insureds. South Carolina
attorneys are also governed by Rule 5.5, which proscribes the practice of law in a
manner that violates any law of the state. The duty of the South Carolina Supreme
Court is to interpret the law. But when faced with an unambiguous, long-standing
statute such as section 40-5-320, the court must enforce it as written. Thus, the
court should prohibit the use of in-house counsel in insurance defense litigation.
Eric Montalvo

133. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103.
134. In re Allstate Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
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